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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
EMILY L. GARDNER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
NEWHOUSE REALTY COMPANY,
a Corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

No. 4651

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT
This is an action by one Emily Gardner to recover
damages for injuries claimed to have been sustained
on the 18th day of November, 1925, at the Newhouse
Hotel in Salt Lake City, Utah.
It is alleged that while the plaintiff was in the act
of entering an elevator at the Newhouse Hotel and before she had an opportunity to get into a safe position
therein, the defendant carelessly and negligently started
the elevator suddenly upward, by reason whereof, as the
said elevator ascended, plaintiff was struck violently upon the shoulder, shoulder blade and back by the top of
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the entrance of said elevator and projections above,
whereby she was knocked to the floor and sustained the
injuries of which she complains.
The amended answer consists of a general denial
of the allegations of the complaint and an affirmative
defense to the effect that plaintiff is barred from recovery by reason of her own contributory negligence.
The acts of contributory negligence alleged were that
she failed to face the front of said elevator and that
she was moving about and conversing with other passengers ail of which directly contributed to the injury,
if any, which she sustained.
To this affirmative matter in the answer no reply
was filed. By elementary rules of pleading the affirmative defense in the answer must therefore be taken to
be true.
The cause came on for trial during September term,
1926, before Judge Morris L. Ritchie with a jury.
After taking all the evidence, an examination of the
premises on which the injury is alleged to have occurred
was made by the court and counsel.
Thereupon counsel for the defendant requested the
court to direct a verdict for the defendant upon two
grounds: First, that there was no evidence of negligence
as alleged in the complaint; Second, that the evidence
affirmatively established that the plaintiff was guilty
of negligence directly contributing to the injuries, if any,
sustained by her.
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The Court in ruling upon and granting this motion
said: (Trans. 215.)
" There is only one act of negligence alleged
and it reads as follows, omitting preliminary
leading up to it:
' And then and there while the plaintiff
was in the act of entering said elevator, and
before she had an opportunity to get to a
safe position therein, the defendant carelessly and negligently started said elevator suddenly upward, by reason whereof as the said
elevator ascended, plaintiff was struck violently upon the shoulder, shoulder blade and
back by the top of the entrance of said elevator and projections above the same, whereby the plaintiff was knocked to the floor of
said elevator and sustained injuries. As I
remarked a moment ago during the argument, I don't see that it is material at all
just what particular part struck her. It is
evident that she was struck by something,
and now the allegation is that while the plaintiff was in the act of entering said elevator,
and before she had an opportunity to get to
a safe position therein this thing happened.
The testimony of both the operator, the
young lady, and the engineer, is that the elevator could not be started until the door was
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closed and locked. That is a physical fact
which is not disputed, so I take it that it must
be taken as true, she evidently was inside the
elevator. I can see how it psychologically
appeared to her; she was in the act of entering, in fact she had just completed the act of
entering, but had not turned around. Whether
she intended to or not nobody knows; whether she ought to or not, that is, whether any
person, as intimated by some of the witnesses, they ought to turn around as soon
as they get in and face the front, we are
not called upon to pass judgment.
The operator, as I understand her testimony, in closing the door, would have to
reach at least partially behind the person
in the position she (Mrs. Gardner, the plaintiff) was in, couldn't get her arm across to
close the door. Let's assume the operator
stands here; this is the entrance, the door is
over there, she has to reach over and pull
the door over in some way, and in order to
do that her arm would necessarily go back
of the plaintiff. Now she did that, she closed
the door and locked it and then started the
elevator. That is her testimony and referring again to her own testimony and that of
the engineer, she couldn't start the elevator
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until she did all these things. That must be
taken to be true.' "
After some questions and suggestions by Judge McKinney, representing the plaintiff, the court continued.
" I think the rod is nearer the center of the
door. Let's state what the facts are; last night
after court, counsel for the plaintiff, Mr. McKinney, and counsel for the defendant, Mr. Christensen, and the court, went over to the Newhouse
Hotel, and we found that the particular elevator,
the east elevator, was somewhat out of repair and
not in use, and we were advised the next one to
it was an elevator of exactly the same pattern, so
we stepped in there and it was operated up to the
Mezzanine floor and back for our benefit. Now
if there is any difference in our recollection as to
that, counsel will recall that we made no comment,
we had agreed to do that, we simply stood there
and looked, such a view as that is really part of
the evidence. But so that I can obviate the difficulty, let's assume that the operator had to put
her hand in some way back of the person, that
statement is withdrawn and eliminated. At any
rate, where the door was closed, whether it was
done mechanically by the operation of the usual
apparatus or not, the plaintiff must have been
inside the door. That still leaves but this space
between the floor and the cage to be accounted

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
for. Whether she was occupying part of that space
or not is a question.
Now referring to what Mr. Murphy, I believe
the gentleman was, said; he testified when he first
noticed her she was down on her knees, and he
thought her feet had caught. I t is easy to see how
he might get that impression, and yet it is purely
an impression, or you might say, I think it is a
psychological illusion; I don't think anyone in
fact believes that her feet were caught, but seeing
here on her knees, he thought that was what happened. I don't think it did happen
We can consider her heels might have been right
at the edge of that ledge; of course the protruding
part of the body behind might have been outside,
the hips, and shoulders, perhaps, but we have
reached this stage, at least I think the proof
shows that it did not occur, her trouble did not
occur, the accident did not occur, while she was
in the act of entering
the act of
entering perhaps may possibly be construed in
that way, but what happened, I think to begin
over, seems to have been this: the door had been
closed, or partially closed, but so far as any evidence shows, not locked. Attention was' called to
the fact, or some one said, part of the party were
not aboard, yet, so the operator opened the door
again, and Mrs. Snyder and Mrs. Gardner, the
plaintiff, stepped in, Mrs. Gardner, coming last,
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then the door was closed and locked and the elevator started.
Let's assume there is a four inch space there,
according to the undisputed testimony, for clearance ; evidently that seemed considerable, but evidently those who construct elevators know what
they are doing, and they allow that much, to make
sure that it would be that much clearance between
the stationary objects, including the frame in
which the elevator moves, whatever it may be
termed, I am not trying to speak accurately, and
the floor of the cage. Now it is conceivable that
a person in her situation may have been partially
within the four inch space, and the parts of the
T56dy hit, most likely would have been either at |Eei
hips or shoulders, or one or the other. Thei'e is no
evidence that she was struck on the hips and there
is no injury to the hips, no reference was made to
that, but reference was made to the injury to the
knee, so that the p a r t struck w*as the part between
the shoulder blades where it was bruised, and that
was so pronounced there is no mistake about it
that she w^as struck by something there. After
she got in the situation, whatever it was, that she
got when the car started, she hadn't turned
around, whether she intended to there is no evidence to show—she could testify herself whether
she intended to turn around, but the allegation of
the complaint is that the car started suddenly up-
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ward. There is no evidence however, that the
movement was anything unusual in that regard,
when a car starts upward, it has started, it begins
to go and keeps on going until some other point
of stoppage is reached. It is conceivable this is
merely speculation. She might have become slightly dizzy and fell backward or to one side, but to
my mind the case took a very different aspect
when the testimony showed there was a car closed
and locked and ivouldn 't move until it was locked,
that ivould negative all the testimony looking in
the direction of starting the car when she had
partly stepped in, or anything of the kind. I cannot see there is any evience of negligence.
This
is the only act alleged, and I think, in face of the
evidence, I think the evidence disproves that.
It is all speculation, just what did' happen, roe
don't know what happened, and it must be proven.
We can't speculate, we have to have some tangible evidence, it may be slight, but there must be
some. I think the court must direct a verdict for
the defendant, because there is lack of evidence of
negligence, and that ivill be the ruling."
It is from the above ruling of the trial court in
directing a verdict for the defendant that the plaintiff
presents this appeal. The reasoning of the trial court in
making that ruling is given at leng*th because it contains
such an excellent and impartial summary and criticism
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of the evidence. The trial judge, saw and heard the
witnesses testify, and it is elementary that his ruling
should not be changed without cogent reasons. Let us
examine therefore into the testimony and authorities
to ascertain whether or not the trial judge was correct
in making the ruling which he did.
The claim of the plaintiff was (Tr. page 1) that while
she was in the act of entering the elevator in question
and before she had an opportunity to get into a safe
position therein, the defendant carelessly and negligently
started said elevator suddenly upward.
This is the only allegation of negligence and of
course it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to make proof
of such negligence. The allegations in) her complaint
are mere conclusions of her own mind and have no probative force.
We turn next to the record in search of proof that
the defendant started the elevator suddenly upward while
plaintiff was in the act of entering, but our search is
vain.
The witness Cyphus testified that, (Trans. 43) with
some others, he got into the elevator and the " operator
closed the door and started u p . " When someone mentioned the fact that some of the party were left outside,
the operator stopped, came down and opened the door
for them to come in. And Mrs. Snyder and Mrs. Gardner (the plaintiff) came in. "As Mrs. Gardner came in,
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immediately after she stepped in, the operator started
the elevator.'' This in itself so far as the testimony of
Cyphus is concerned, shows that Mrs. Gardner was in the
elevator and not in the act of entering. He later says
(Trans. 45) when asked whether he saw the operator
close the elevator door that to the best of his recollection
the door was "just in the act of being closed." Everything with him, as with Mrs. Gardner, was "just in the
act of being done." But the undisputed testimony set
forth hereinafter conclusively shows that the elevator
door was closed and locked, and had to be so before the
car would move and that the plaintiff, who as well as
her witnesses, was making a desperate effort to remember the allegations of her complaint, to the effect
that she was "in the act" of doing this or that, was
inside.
Cyphus on cross examination testified (Trans. 55)
that the plaintiff was his mother's sister; that nothing
extended into the elevator cage; (Trans. 57) that the
cage was absolutely free from any injection from outside.
He testified further that to the best of his recollection
the door was partially open (Trans. 59) at the time the
elevator started. It will be noticed hereafter that Mrs.
Gardner also testified that the door was not closed at
the time the elevator started. This was the basis of their
case of negligence which later being disproved by the
undisputed fact that the elevator could not move with
the door opened brought ruin to the plaintiff.
Frank Murphy, a witness for plaintiff testified that
"Immediately after that (i. e., descending and receiving
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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\\u> other guests) as the ele\ai«»r .^a *•..-«. ,>,. , ,.,;.![« JM.--I
«•'. 1 couldn't say whether 1 hoard a voice, 01 exactly
what attracted my attention to the front nt' the car,
but just as I faced around I saw \\v>. (jarduer falling
towards the floor, that is, v ith h»-r kneos toward the floor
of the car and 1 h a w rathoi a rorollertnm that her,—
slu* made an impression that snmoono, or so mo thing had
held her feel, her fool had i^«i <':i\iir lit -" *
Now there ts ;IM n a i oMnumnon .v.; is there any
proof that her foot wi-r, in fact caught. This witness
saw nothing;, IK* siiuplx got, as the court said,, 44 an erroneous psychological impression." Ho did not see what
struck her. (Trans. 69) In response to a number of
loading and suggestive questions l>\ plaintiff's counsel
he stressed again the fact thai !n> ;.ioa
Impression was
that Mrs. Uardner's feet had been eaughi. (Trans. 69-70)
Thi<% oi oour>o, i> no ovidonco of nogSior-nro on the part
of tin? defondai.il.
This same witness on cross-examination was asked;
' ' H e r 1V«M were not on-jtrhi in i]u* .-nr wore ihov? M
"* ' * :'ldnk U*A
\ «»u ds.»l i-i«. lo-::: hor eonmlnin of her feet,
hoimr Isn- \ » d ; *>n ' *'

' * -a d-i:"1 *.^" •- - •- i -o' >• Kh->sJ^diro, aside
. ;:^:: *A liiii p^opi* i**lij \nn, -^ if*M i*-- 4n- foil down, or
whether stunt-thing struck her, or what sii i- k her, You
didn't see ai rything strike her did y o u ? "
, ..
;
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A. "No, I did not."

r

.

Mr. McKinney, counsel for plaintiff, here made a
desparate effort to make a show of negligence on the
ground that the elevator was crowded. The court's attention is respectfully called to Mr. McKinney's'Be-direct examination of Witness Murphy. (Trans. 76)
Q. "Counsel asked you if there was room in the
elevator for Mrs. Gardner to get in; you mean by that
there was room there if she had been given time to get
in, do you?" An objection was interposed but before
ruling was made counsel interposed a new question.
Q. *' You stated there was room in the car for Mrs.
Gardner to get in. Please explain to the jury."
Now the answer of the witness required no explanation. But struggling between his conscience and the evident intention of the question, he answered: '' That's my
recollection, there was room for her to have got into
the elevator." Another answer which required no explanation, but counsel was not satisfied and asked again,
"You mean by that there was room enough in the elevator to accomodate more persons—is that what you
mean?"
A. " I mean, my judgment of the thing, there would
be room in an elevator of that size, and also that there
seemed to me at that time to be room to accomodate all
the people who were in the car." This, it will be remembered, was the plaintiff's own witness and on direct examination, but counsel will have it his way and asks:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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" I t was pretty badly crowded, wasn't it! The elevator
wasn't very big, the elevator cages?" The court SUB
tained an objection to the question, and in response to
another querry of the same type the witness answered
that there was sufficient room in the elevator, (Trans.
»';? Thn> i-ndi'l *hi- a;!>-<:;i-: in establish negligence.
Counsel for plaintiff wa> not sworn to testify and except
for his testimony there was no evidence in this regard,
Mrs. F r a n k Murphy testified (Trans. 80) that she
entered the elevator, walked toward the back and as she
turned around she saw Mrs. Gardner falling. .The remainder of her testimony relates to the bruise or wound
on Mrs. Gardner's back,
•' '
^-'
I iOretta Snyder testified (Trans.! •- : i„u HU- rnn-ied
the elevator and that Mrs, Gardner IVii a#n;n>t IHT back,
that she did not s<»e Mrs, l . , - . ^ u - « dl nur &^e what
struck her,
;: Emily Gardner (plaintiff) testified ^Tia;-. ;i.:j ihat
it was either the center or the east elevator upon whu-h
she rode. That she did use the same elevator several
times that evening prior to \\n- ;\ri*\*u-.:> ?'?,-^ •*;)
T h a i s h e S U p p u ^ ' t i *};. \.;M\ b o t h tVH oi th,- Hi'Vai*>[
l"on- \\ ^ a . l o d ; ;.Tran~>. 118) t h a t tin* d-»»»r
^ • : - -»pt»n w\\f\\ V* s t a l l s

1

1V

* *

^Tr:i!-

hr-

i ' hv i ' l ^ v a i u r
'•'*-"

T h m i^Htj^rti n»-;. considerable medical testimony,
parii'-f.d:n •;- of • ***•?.;\. chiropractors who nMifu'd con'•cr!, )u ni.i^rics tii ])laintiff. They testified that a certain
X-liay pi*.'i -» JT;. I -h -iw.wi-d a subluxation • • • '•*• of the
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vertebrae of the spine, because certain oblique lines appeared on either side of the axis. Dr. J. J. Galligan,
however, testified (Trans. 194) that those lines simply
indicated that the patient's head was tilted at the time
the photograph was taken.
A. " It would indicate that her head was tilted just
a little bit—as a matter of fact her head was not straight
when this picture was taken.''
It is readily seen from the testimony of the plaintiff and her witnesses that there is absolutely no evidence
that the elevator was started upward with any unusual
or negligent suddenness and from the testimony of the
plaintiff herself she was in the elevator. Reliance is apparently made in the testimony above upon the contended
fact that the elevator was started before the door had
been closed. That such could not possibly have been the
case was demonstrated beyond any doubt by the testimony of Claude J. Hooper, who testified (Trans. 196)
that he was an engineer, that he had an intimate acquaintance with the elevators at the Newhouse Hotel.
Q. "Can you tell me whether or not it is possible
for those elevators to operate when the doors are open?"
A. "Absolutely impossible to run a car with the
doors open."
Q. '* Tell the jury why and what the mechanism is.fr
A. "There is a safety switch on each door. The
electric line goes to the controller; the other side of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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line goes through these door switches, and if a door is
open the circuit is open and the elevator cannot get the
current to pass through that open circuit.'9
Q. " You mean by the switch being open that there
is no current or power?"
A. "No power in the controller of the car."
He further testified (Trans. 199) that to close the
door it was necessary for the girl operating the elevator
to put her arm along the opening of the cage.
Mary Gerber, the operator of the elevator on the
night of the accident was then called as a witness for
the defendant. She testified (Trans. 201) that on the
evening of November 18, 1925, she was operating the
east elevator; (Trans. 202) that a group of about
eight people got into her elevator and she took
them up to the mezzanine floor and down again.
That subsequently they came to her elevator again
to be carried to the mezzanine floor. (Trans. 203)
"On returning to the elevator there was six in
the crowd came to the elevator, all facing the door,
and I closed the door and went to start up, when they
said there was some more coming, and I opened the door
and waited, and no one came, so I looked out to see if
someone was coming, and there they were coming and
taking their time, so I waited for them to enter the elevator. When they entered the elevator everyone faced
the door except Mrs. Gardner. She stood even with me
in the elevator, her feet right flat on the floor. I went to
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shut the door but it didn 't lock. I reopened it and locked
the door, so I turned the elevator on, and as I turned
round to tell her to face the door I noticed her stumble
to the floor, and grabbed hold of her arm." She testified further that she walked behind Mrs. Gardner to
shut the door; (Trans. 204) that her elevator was of
only moderate speed; (Trans. 206) that it takes a short
time after the power is turned on and the door locked
for the elevator to start; that everyone was standing
firm in the elevator when it started, (Trans. 207) even
to Mrs. Gardner; that she had to pass her arm behind
the plaintiff to close the door to the cage. (Trans. 208)
It is indeed amusing after reviewing this evidence
to turn to plaintiff's brief. In the last paragraph on page
twelve, totally forgetting the evidence and drawing conclusions from their own minds counsel say:
" Visualizing the scene as portrayed by the evidence, the plaintiff is observed entering the elevator, immediately preceded by Mrs. Snyder, who
has not yet had opportunity to turn around, while
others are only in the act of turning. Plaintiff's
feet appear to be at the edge of, or projecting
into, the four inch space between the edge of the
cage and the door, while part of her back protrudes beyond the edge of the car. The operator
is hurried. Knowing that plaintiff's back is to
the door, she starts the cage before telling plaintiff, or giving her time, to get safely into the
car and face the front, The ascending ear swiftly
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carried plaintiff violently against object above
and she is hurled to the floor of the elevator with
her head to the north."
Now there is no evidence quoted in their brief nor
in the record that Mrs. Snyder had not had time to turn
around. And one cannot believe that they make the
statement that the evidence shows Mrs. Gardner's feet
to have been projecting over the edge in good faith. The
testimony of Mrs. Gardner and Mr. and Mrs. Murphy
is that her feet were inside. The testimony of the operator is that they were "right flat on the floor." There
is no testimony that the operator was hurried, unless
Mr. McKinney's testimony be counted, and although
he testified considerably it was not under oath.
There is not one bit of testimony even tending in
any way to show that the operator was incompetent.
It is elementary that the plaintiff must establish that
the injury was occasioned by the negligence of the defendant, and of course negligence is never presumed, but
must be established by competent proof. This is a fundamental principle of the law of evidence and is supported
by reason and authority; 1 Greenl. Evidence, Section
8P and cases cited; 2 Redfield on Railways (6th Edition) page 268; 1 Sherman and R. on Negligence
(4th Edition, Sec. 55); 4 Elliot on Railways, sections 1583-1587; Wharton on Negligence, Section 421; 1
Borer on Railroads, page 697, paragraph 7, where the
author says: " It is a well settled principle of the common law, that to recover for injuries or loss occasioned
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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by negligence, the negligence must be alleged by the
plaintiff in his pleadings, and must by him be proven,
negligence is never presumed.'' This court in Major vs.
0. S. L. R. R. Co., 21 Utah 145 approved an instruction
to the effect that "negligence is never presumed/' Of
course this is not a case in which the doctrines of res ipsa
loquitur would apply. It is not contended that there was
a breaking of machinery or anything of that nature.
The most that can be said for the plaintiff is that
she proved that she had suffered an injury, but mere
proof of injury is no proof of negligence. Major v. 0.
S. L. R. R. Co., at 21 Utah 145 "and the mere proof that
an injury was received on the train or vehicle is not
sufficient to raise the presumption of negligence, it must
further be shown that there was some defect in appliance
or the manner of their use. M
In Harry Wells vs. Utah Construction Co., 27 Utah
524, the court held that refusal to instruct that "The
mere fact the accident happened is not sufficient proof
to charge the defendant with negligence" was ground
for reversal. In Brymer vs. Southern Pacific Co., 90
Cal. 296; 27 p. 371 the defendant requested the court to
instruct that "the mere fact that an accident occurred
by which plaintiff was injured does not fix the liability,
or even raise a .presumption that the defendant was at
fault in providing machinery or appliances for the labor
in whicli the plaintiff was engaged." The defendant
moved for a new trial, which was granted on the ground

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
that the court erred in refusing to give the instruction
requested.
The case of Marker vs. Mitchell, Ohio, 1893, 54 Fed.
637 is much relied upon by the appellant. The case is
not only old but contains no statement of facts from
which we are able to ascertain how the injury was caused,
i. e., whether through breaking of machinery, clothes being caught or otherwise. The writer cannot find in the
case any such ruling as is set out at the bottom of page
14 of appellant's brief. And moreover, if appellant cites
the case as an authority for the degree of care required
of one who operates an elevator it is distinctly against
her, the court saying at page 638 that the language used
by the trial court to the effect that the "highest degree
of care consistent with the possibility of injury", was
required, was not fortunate, that only a proportionate
reasonable degree of care under the circumstances was
required. The case evidently went off on the question
as to whether or not a skillful employee had been obtained, and the question of excessive damages.
Of course if the plaintiff wishes to prove that the
operator of an elevator is an insurer of the safety of
his passengers, all the cases cited in her brief are against
her. The case of Goodsell vs. Taylor, 1 Minn, 207; 42
N. W. 873—simply applies the rule of reasonable care.
In Hensler vs. Stex, 113 Mo. app., 162; 88 S. W. 108,
the elevator was started when the operator knew or
should have known that plaintiff's dress was caught in
the door. Clearly that case has no application here. As
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to the standard of care required, the court clearly holds
that the care required is that of a prudent, practical man
under the circumstances. The rest of the cases cited
by counsel concern themselves with care in selection of
operatives and construction of the elevator to prevent
breaking of machinery, etc. With those problems we are
not concerned. There is neither complaint nor proof
that the defendant either employed a careless servant or
had an elevator which was not properly constructed. The
trial court clearly analyzed the case when he said that
the only act of negligence alleged was that the elevator
was started suddenly upward while the plaintiff was in
the act of entering. The record shows that she had
completed the act of entering and the door of the cage
had been closed and locked, and that to close and lock
the door the arm of the operator had gone behind Mrs.
Gardner who was certainly, therefore, inside the cage
and not in the act of entering.
The burden is upon the appellant to show reversable
error in the record and in this respect the evidence must
be considered in the view most favorable to the conclusions of the court, Shean vs. Cook, 179 p. 185 (Cal),
where the court said: "The main question presented
by the appeal is as to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the finding of the court that Mrs. Cook was
not a stockholder in the corporation. In determining
that question we must consider the evidence from the
view most favorable to the conclusion of the court."
Eitz vs. Carpenter, 178 N. W. 877.
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In other words all reasonable presumptions are made
in favor of the trial court.
It is the duty of one insisting on error to make the
same affirmatively appear. Cortner vs. Hill 110 So. 322
(Ala).
The burden is upon appellants to show error. Consumers Ice & Coal Co. vs. Security Bank. 280 S. W. 677
(Ark).
In Goodale vs. Thorn, 249 Pac. 11 (Cal), it is held
that to justify reversal error must bej clearly shown.
If the law were otherwise there would be no finality or
stability to any decision. A contrary doctrine would
require the absurd conclusion that decisions are presumed to be erroneous. The decisions are uniform that
the appellant must overcome the presumption in favor
of the decision and show error affirmatively. Daly vs.
Irwin, 243 p. 443 (Cal). Furlong vs. Alexander, 243 P.
887 (Cal). Jacquith vs. Justices et etc., 247 p 224 (Cal).
Robinson vs. Godfrey, 248 p. 268 (Cal).
In Davitt v. Long Bell Farm Land Corp. 110 So. 88
(La) it is held that appellant's burden of showing error
is not discharged by showing mere conflict in evidence.
In State vs. American Bank and Trust Co., 243 p.
1093 (Mont.) it is held that appellants have burden to
show that conclusion of trial court cannot be sustained
on any admissible theory. Gravelin vs. Porter, 250 p.
• 823 (Mont).
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Simpson v. Tobacco Growers Assn., 130 S. E. 507
(N. C ) , appellant must make error appear plainly as
presumption is against him.
State v. Mouvies Land Assn., 207 N. W. 492 (N. D.).
Curtain vs. Moroney, 246 Pac. 232 (Okla). Quinn v.
Drummond, 132 Atl. 439 (R. I ) . Ives vs. Rutland, 133
S. E. 539 (S. C.) U. S. F. & Q. vs. Rochester, 281, S. W.
306 affirmed 283 S. W. 135 (Texas). Wisconsin Face
& Fire Brick Co. vs. Bonnett Const. Co., 206 N". W. 204
(Wis.).
It is our contention that no error is shown in the
record here and that the holding below should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
HENRY D. MOYLE,
J. M. CHRISTENSEN.
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